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Subway system is one of the critical infrastructures in a society. In economic optimizations of risk control 
measures, valuing the loss of life and other financial losses in terms of money on the other hand, could influence 
the optimal investments in safety. The purpose is to contribute to the implementation of HSE in the 
transportation system. In this research, a fire risk assessment along with its economic loss estimation in the 
Direct Current (DC) trains and rectifier substation (RS) of Tehran subway is implemented. The number of 
fatalities, the extent of damage on the train equipment, etc., is then calculated in monetary unit. 
By using Event Tree Analysis (herein ETA), after identification of initiating events through observation, 
interviews, and evaluation of documents, event tree was constructed for each of them and the probability of 
multiple scenarios were computed. 
The scenario with the highest probability of fire in RS, including increased heats in the RTU panels generate a 
loss of at least 730 Million Rials. Accordingly, the minimum and maximum economic loss caused by fire on DC 
trains is minimum 510 and 1230 Million Rials, respectively. 
Conclusion: Given the findings of this study, the financial and human life risks, along with all tangible and 
intangible losses, which is considerable, the relevant managers must compare investments in safety, with the 
decrease of calculated economic risks as a result of fire accident in Tehran subway. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We live in a world of systems and risk. With 
systems and technology that come exposed to 
accidents, as such systems can fail or work 
improperly resulting in damaging, injury, and 
death. Since the industrial revolution, technical 
hazards, such as airplane crashes, train derailments, 
tunnel fires and industrial accidents also disrupt 
society on a regular basis. Subway system is among 
the infrastructure systems in the transportation 
industry that can be exposed to the risk of fire, 
flood, earthquake and similar events can be made 
in addition to the catastrophic losses caused a 
shock to the society [1, 2]. The occurrence of fire is 
most threatening risk to people in the subway 
space, so that according to the previous studies 
irreversible losses of the occurrence of fire in the 
subway stations and tunnels are created [3-7].  
Based on studies of the International Association of 
Public Transport in 2009, the occurrence of fire in 
the subway system can be divided and be examined 
into train and station subsystems [8]. Fire caused 
by electrical current is one of the most significant 
causes of fire stations, tunnels and subway trains 
[9].Based on the SFPE (book of fire protection 
engineering) Fire risk, is defined as the 
identification of potential unintended risks and its 
adverse consequences on people's lives, health, 
properties and the environment [10]. Statistics 
show that the highest percentage of fires in the 
subway (34%) is due to problems with the 
electrical system, which can occur in two major 
subsystems of the stations and trains [11]. 
Typically any station subway has different parts 
that Light Power Substation (henceforth LPS) and 
Rectifier Substation (henceforth RS) with regard to 
their important role as power supplies for the 
station and the train are more important [12]. The 
task of Rectifier Substation is power supplies for 
third rail and train. In this unit, the power of 20 KV 
is converted to the three-phase 592 V and then to 
750 V DC, by transformer and is used for the third 
rail and train feeding. 
Panel of 20 KV; obtain this voltage from the High 
Voltage System (HVS) and Resin transformers is 
feed by two transformer feeders. Rectifier 
transformer converts voltage to 592 volts and give 
it into power rectifier to rectify it, on the other hand 
the AC voltage of 592 volts is converted to 750 
volts DC. Then the voltage of 750 volts DC is 
placed to 750 V DC boards. The panel consists of 
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disconnect switch and a motion rail voltage 
protection panel [13]. 
Experience has shown that electrical fires in 
tunnels and subway stations can be happened in the 
incidence of arc or short circuit in the power cables 
in panels and electrical equipment [14, 15]. At 
present, two types of trains including Alternative 
Current (henceforth AC) and Direct Current 
(henceforth DC) in Tehran subway lines are used. 
Based on available statistics during the years of 
2003 to 2012,145 cases of ceiling resistance fire 
have occurred in the DC trains [16]. 
In this study, it has been attempted to evaluate the 
risk of fire in the DC trains and RS in Tehran 
subway line 1 station. The key to system safety and 
effective risk management is the identification and 
mitigation of hazards. To successfully control risks, 
it is necessary to understand the hazards and to 
identify them in the first place. The elimination of 
hazards can prevent death, injury, system loss and 
damage to the environment. In other words, since 
traditional safety management pattern is highly 
dependent on people’s experience and thus hard to 
cope with serious safety situation, it is urgent to 
start research on safety risk management system, 
technology and relevant standards to cope with 
serious situation in today world. The risk analysis 
is defined as all the methods that are involved in 
evaluating the safety of facilities, verifying the risk 
from recognizing dangers, identifying models for 
certain events, and estimating the risk in a 
quantitative way. A checklist technique and hazard 
and operability method (HAZOP) can be used to 
verify the risk and a fault tree analysis (FTA) and 
event tree analysis (ETA) is used to model events 
and estimate the risk [17]. 
Several studies have used ETA technique. For 
instance, Paul Mann (2005) applied a combination 
of two techniques including the fault tree and the 
event tree, to do a quantitative risk assessment 
model (QRA), for assessing the risk of fire in high-
speed train [18].Another study of fire risk 
assessment in Bucharest underground public 
transportation system was done in which, several 
related theoretical pieces to specific risks during 
the paneling underground transportation system 
were considered [19]. 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the 
implementation of HSE (health, safety, and 
environment) in transportation, as well as 
development projects such as the development of 
efficient urban transport system. To this aim, since 
quantitative methods are widely applicable method 
to fire risk assessment [10], Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA) technique is used to evaluate the fire risk in 
stations and trains in Tehran subway. The number 
of fatalities, the extent of possible damage on the 
train equipment, etc., were then calculated in terms 
of monetary unit, so that, the investments in safety 
is compared (by relevant managers) with the 
decrease of calculated economic risks as a result of 
fire accident. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS  
In this study the Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
technique was used to determine the damage 
caused by fire in the DC trains and RS in Tehran 
subway line 1 station. The frequency of occurrence 
and the potential consequences that arise from the 
fire risk, in terms of financial loss is then 
computed. Event tree is an analysis technique for 
identifying and evaluating the sequence of events 
in a potential accident scenario following the 
occurrence of an initiating event. ETA utilizes a 
visual logic tree structure known as an event tree 
(ET).  
In this method, an initiating event such as the 
malfunctioning of a system, process, or 
construction is considered as the starting point and 
the predictable accidental results, which are 
sequentially propagated from the initiating event, 
are presented in order graphically. ETA is a system 
model representing system safety based on the 
safeties of sub events. It is called an event tree 
because the graphical presentation of sequence 
events grows like a tree as the number of events 
increases. As it is shown in Fig. 1, ETA consists of 
several steps [17]. 
 
Fig. 1: Flow chart of the ETA 
Reference: Korea Occupational Safety and Health Agency, 1997 
 
The objective of ETA is to determine whether the 
initiating event will develop into a serious mishap 
or if the event is sufficiently controlled by the 
safety systems and procedures implemented in the 
system design. The ETA is a very powerful tool for 
identifying and evaluating all of the system 
consequences paths that are possible after an initial 
event occurs. The purpose of ETA is to evaluate all 
the possible outcomes that can result from an 
initiating event. Generally, there are many different 
outcomes possible from an initiating event, 
depending upon whether the design safety system 
work properly or malfunction, when needed. ETA 
provides a probabilistic risk assessment of the risk 
associated with each potential outcome. 
Initiating events identifying 
Safety function selection 
Event tree construction 
Quantitative risk assessment 
Analized result reporting 
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The present research is conducted in four steps: the 
first step is to identify the initiating events based on 
observation, interview and documents review. A 
system or equipment failure or human error which 
may be initiating event, depending on how the 
system or operators responds to the event, which 
could result in the desired effects. The second step 
is identifying the barriers (safety factors) designed 
to respond to the initiating event. The Barriers arise 
in response to the initiator factors or reducing 
agents as a defense system against potential 
outcomes of the initiating event are considered. 
The analyst should identify, all safeguards that can 
protect against or mitigate the effect of the starting 
event, in the chronological order in which, they are 
expected to respond. The description of such 
barriers should state their intended purpose. The 
third step is constructing the event tree. In this step, 
the initiating event and barriers that apply to the 
analysis is entered. The initiating cause or loss 
event is shown on the left-hand side of the page, 
and the barriers are listed across the top of the 
page. The next pace is to evaluate barriers. 
Normally only two possibilities are considered 
including the failure or success of the barrier.  
The analyst should assume that the initiating cause 
has occurred, define the success or failure criteria 
for barrier, and decide whether the success or 
failure of the barrier affects the course of the 
incident. If the incident is affected, the event tree 
divides into two paths to distinguish between the 
success and failure of the barrier. Normally, 
success of the function is denoted by an upward 
path, and failure of the function, by a downward 
path. If the barrier has no impact on the course of 
the incident, the incident path proceeds, with no 
branch point, to the next barrier. In the fourth step, 
due to the absence of detailed documentation, 
exponential quantity based on the expert opinions 
take place (interviews included individuals with 
related work experience, technical and supervision 
staff). Then sequence of predicated consequences 
of events is described. The probability of different 
consequences is calculated by multiplying the 
probabilities of each factor in the branch for each 
scenario. The following formula is used to 
calculate the probability of each branch [20, 21]: 
 
Pr (chain A) = Pr (Initiating event).∏                     
 
Then according to obtained scenarios, the amount 
of economic losses caused by fire in DC trains and 
RS is determined. 
 
RESULTS 
According to the applied Event Tree Analysis 
technique, 32 scenarios obtained for rectifier 
substation that 16 scenarios lead to fire. In table 1, 
the initiating events and safety factors identified is 
presented. 
Table1: Initiating events and safety factors 
Safety factors(barriers) Initiating events  
Failure of over load relays 
operating, Non-functioning 
detector, The absence of fire 
extinguisher, The absence of 
sprinkler 
Increase heat in 
thepanels20 kV 
1 
Non-function of transformer 
temperature controller , Non-
functioning detector, The 
absence of fire extinguisher, 
The absence of sprinkler 





Failure of over load relays 
operating, Non-functioning 
detector, The absence of fire 
extinguisher, The absence of 
sprinkler 




Failure of over load relays 
operating, Non-functioning 
detector, The absence of fire 
extinguisher, The absence of 
sprinkler 
Increase heat in 
the RTU panels 
4 
Lack of operating of explosion 
proof fans, Non-functioning 
detector, The absence of fire 
extinguisher, The absence of 
sprinkler 
Accumulation of 




Given that, it is not possible to provide the whole 
event tree in this paper, the scenario with the 
highest probability of fire on RS, including 
“increased heat in the RTU panels, non-functional 
over load relays, non-functioning detectors, no fire 
extinguishers, no operation sprinkler” is presented 
(figure 2) 
A: Increase heat in the RTU panels    B: Failure of over load relays 
operating 
C: Non-functioning detector               D: The absence of fire extinguisher 
E: The absence of sprinkler                 F: false     S: successful 
 
Fig.2: Event tree with increase heat in the RTU panels in 
RS scenario 
Considering the above scenarios, the consequences, 
including the loss of RTU panel and the deaths of 
at least 2 people (people working in the post), the 
amount of damages was specified [based on the 
atonement of 2012 in Iran]. Then the levels of risk 
scenario through multiplying the probability of the 
scenario outcomes to the maximum amount of 730 
million Rials were identified (based on the price of 
1391 Iranian calendar year). Also, the tree has been 
drawn to DC train, where, 5 scenarios were 
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identified. In this part most occurrence probability 
related to scenario 3, the rate of 6.3 × 10-3 has been 
proposed (see figure 3) 
A: fire resistance of roof                  B: fire detection          C: response 
operator 
D: passengers evacuation                 E: fire control 
 
Fig. 3: Event tree with fire resistant scenario in DC train 
Considering the number of people at risk and the 
extent of possible damage on the train equipment, 
the damage caused by the fire was specified. 
Accordingly, the minimum and maximum 
economic loss caused by fire on DC trains was 
computed about 510 million Rials and 1230 million 
Rials, respectively (calculated based on the price of 
1391 Iranian calendar year). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Fire accidents are one of the most possible events 
especially in subway systems. As from 1999 to 
2010 media reports, ninety-two accidents happened 
in metro rail transit projects, 68 people died from 
these accidents and direct economic losses stood at 
least 4.1 billion Yuan in China [22]. 
According to the U.S. national fire date center 
(2014), an estimated 25900 residential building 
electrical fires are reported to fire departments 
within the United States each year. These fires 
caused an estimated 280 deaths, 1125 injuries and 
$1.1 billion in property loss [23]. As the Cascee 
and Raconin; report (mentioned in Duarte, 2004), 
the causes of electrical fire in nuclear plants of 
United States and Europe are including 26% 
transformers, 26%switches and circuit switches, 
communication terminal 15%, and also 10%wires 
and cables[24]. Based on the result of the Event 
Tree Analysis of the present research in rectifier 
substation, the most important cause of electrical 
fire spread on boards and systems, was the 
malfunction of embedded control systems on 
equipment. This could happen because of several 
reasons among which are the lacks of effective 
inspection and maintenance programs for early 
detection of possible defects. 
Our results are consistent with a number of studies 
such as Amiri (2010). Her findings indicates that, 
the main causes of fires in passenger trains are 
specified in subsets of motor generators and 
mechanical systems, generators and electrical 
systems, telecommunications, steam generation, 
electricity and ventilation of passenger cars[25]. 
The worst possible outcome of the Event Tree 
Analysis technique in the DC trains including the 
scenario of events “if the roof fire resistance would 
occur, -fire detection is not done-, leading does not 
respond imply and appropriately - the fire is not 
quenched”. In another study, Jafarian2011 
investigated the reasons for the exit of the train line 
in Iran using fault tree analysis techniques and 
event tree integration fussy. According to his 
results, from the 41 final detected events," incorrect 
pin adjustment" and "not recognized fault for part 
of the line" was identified as the root causes of 
risks and uncertainties of fuzzy output. His results 
also show that, the scenario of events "the exit of 
the train from the Line, the train would be diverted 
to the adjacent line, at least one of the train wagons 
fall aside, a secondary collision occurs, the second 
train is passenger train " were identified as the main 
scenario for total risks [26]. 
In summary, considering the economic loss 
estimation in Tehran subway that implemented in 
this study, metro rail transit is basically subject to 
safety risks, which are part of the technical risks. In 
general, to mitigate these accidents, there are 
several principles which should be followed. First 
of all, all parties relevant to the project should 
participate in the safety risk management, such as 
the government, metro rail transit projects owners, 
the design institutes, the construction companies, 
the supervision companies and the third party 
monitoring companies. Secondly, safety risk 
management should run through the lifecycle of 
metro rail transit projects, regardless of stages of 
feasibility study, prospecting, design, construction 
and trial operation. Thirdly, cyclically monitoring 
and testing the key safety risks must be sustained. 
Finally, safety risk management participators 
should constitute task force for the purpose of 
sharing their professional knowledge, moreover 
sharing rewards or undertaking punishments 
linking up to success or failure [27]. 
 
CONCLUSSIONS 
Our findings indicate that, scenario with the highest 
occurrence probability of fire in RS including 
"increased heat in the RTU panels generates at least 
a loss equivalent to 730 Million Rials. Accordingly, 
the minimum and maximum economic losses 
caused by fire on DC trains are including 510 and 
1230 Million Rials respectively (based on the price 
of 1391 Iranian calendar year).Thereforeو based on 
the findings of this study, financial and human life 
risks, show that the losses are significant. However, 
much more work needs to be performed to identify, 
quantify, rank and mitigate the potential hazards 
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posed by the fire risk in Tehran Subway. Finally, 
given that, rail transportation safety is achieved 
only, when every single one factors are considered 
in a comprehensive safety management system, and 
because transportation system is run and controlled 
by public sector, the political costs also (which 
needs to be considered in a separate research) have 
to be added to the economic costs. 
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